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Gassendi's views. It is Bernier's text that is translated
into English in Three Discourses ofHappiness, Virtue
and Liberty, a 1699 publication on moral philosophy
that is attributed to Gassendi. 6 To better comprehend
the views of Gassendi as understood by seventeenthcentury Gassendists, in what follows, English
translations of passages presenting Gassendi's view
will, where possible, be.taken from Three Discourses
on Happiness, Virtue and Liberty.? Likewise, English
translations of passages from Gassendi 's representation
ofEpicurus' view will be taken from Thomas Stanley's
translation of Gassendi's Philosophiae Epicuri

Syntagma. 8

I

In the context of Gassendi's virtue ethics, in which
he defmes moral philosophy as "the art of doing well"
[TD, 2],9 Gassendi discusses the fundamental virtues
of temperance, fortitude, justice, and prudence, with
happiness as the summum bonum. Vegetarianism is said
to be a requirement of sobriety, a virtue of temperance.
He explains:

Gassendi, who was influenced in the development
of his moral theory by Epicurus,2 was, as was Epicurus,
a vegetarian. Gassendi argues, in his Philosophiae
Epicuri Syntagma,3 his reconstruction of Epicurus'
theory, and in his Syntagma Philosophicum,4 presenting
his own ethics, that abstaining from flesh is a moral
requirement, i.e., a requirement for "doing well."5
Further, Gassendi represents, as an Epicurean position,
the view that rights and the obligations attendant upon
rights pertain only to those bound together by a social
contract, and, agreements with animals being infeasible,
we have no obligations which follow from their rights.
Why and how, then, is vegetarianism a moral
requirement? In what follows, I will examine a
Gassendist response to this question to ascertain how
vegetarianism can be supported in the context of a
Gassendist moral theory.
Bernier's Abrege de la Philosophie de Gassendi
(Lyons, 1684), which is an abridgement and translation
into French of Gassendi's lengthy Latin Syntagma
Philosophicum, served to popularize Gassendi's views.
Bernier provides a reasonably faithful rendition of
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It is therefore an undeniable truth, that
happiness, or a life free from pain and misery,
are such things as influence all our actions and
purposes to the obtaining of them. [TD, 1]

Following Epicurus, Gassendi identifies happiness
with pleasure, and pleasure, he claims, is to be correctly
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analyzed as the "relief from" or "absence of' pain or
misery. [G, 2.415] Pain, from this viewpoint. is a priori
undesirable and, in itself, bad. The good, as pleasure,
is measured by the extent to which an action retains an
absence of pain or relieves pain without producing
additional pains.
Gassendi's moral theory, then, can be said to involve
the following principle, which I shall refer to as "the
principle ofleast pain": "Living well" consists in doing
that which will be most effective in minimizing pain in
one's own body and mind. Though pleasure associated
with excessive and sumptuous eating satisfies hunger,
unlike moderate eating, it bears with itself pains, and
hence, this action is not a good. Sobriety is essential to
living well.
In regard to diet, the following principle is required
to satisfy the principle ofleast pain: Act only on desires
for that which is both natural and necessary. That which
is both natural and necessary, we are told, will relieve
hunger and its associated pains without producing new
pains; but a variety of discomforts follow from the
consumption of that which is unnecessary or unnatural,
and, hence, these should be avoided. Further, Gassendi
contends in support of his vegetarianism, the
consumption of flesh is neither natural nor necessary
for human beings. What he means by "necessary" and
"natural" requires clarification.
That which is necessary, according to Gassendi, is
the minimum required, in quantity and effort. to maintain
one's health and well-being. He argues (YD, 147ff.]:

Gassendi represents this as Epicurus' view:
To accustom ourselves to a simple diet brings
and preserves health. For it is sumptuous
feasting and variety of meats which [causes]
head-aches, rheums, gouts, fevers and other
diseases; not plain and simple food. (SPE, 917]
Further, desiring the minimum required to maintain
one's health and well-being "renders us fearless of
fortune" for:
[H]e, who is content with coarse food, as fruits
and salads, who is satisfied with bread and
water, who has confined his desire with these,
what can he fear from Fortune? For, who is
there so poor as to want these? Who so
distressed that he cannot easily meet with
beans, pulse, herbs, fruits? As for water, what
need I mention it? [SPE, 918]
A simple diet, simple in its substance and in its
accessibility, contributes to a state of equilibrium of
mind and body, which, if established, allows for
activities which are satisfying in themselves, such as
the experience of pure pleasures, e.g., of philosophy
and of music, which are free of pain.
To demonstrate that flesh is not necessary for the
health of human beings, Gassendi concurs with the
Epicurean claim that "the eating of flesh is less to be
approved, as being rather prejudicial to health than
wholesome" [SPE, 918] because:

1. Very little is required to satisfy basic needs
and to maintain a healthy body, and these
needs can be satisfied with little effort, and,
hence, without pain.

[H]ealth is preserved by the same means
whereby it is recovered; but it is manifest that
it is recovered by a thin diet and abstinence
fromflesh. [SPE,918] .

2. Excesses, beyond what is physically necessary
to maintain the body, can produce various
sorts of pains, and such luxuries are often
difficult to obtain.

If health can be recovered, indeed is best recovered, by
means of a diet that contains no flesh, then, it is argued,
health can also be preserved without eating flesh, so
flesh foods are not necessary for human health. As
such, eating flesh is an excess, and, like other excesses,
it is an indulgence that can cause pain. Further, it is
assumed that flesh foods are more difficult to obtain
and to prepare than "fruits and salads," "bread and
water"; in desiring flesh, then, we become more subject
to the difficulties associated with seeking to obtain
such foods.

3. Therefore the best way to avoid pain is to
avoid the desire for excesses and to be content
with a little.
Being content with a little, he contends, is the most
effective way to satisfy the principle of least pain; the
way to avoid pain and suffering is not by striving to
acquire more, but rather by desiring less.
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It might be objected that Gassendi's assumptions
are overhasty. Consider the following society of the
isolated and unknown island Isla; encircled and cut
off from the sea by huge rocky cliffs. On Isla the soil
is such that no trees and no crops other than grass will
grow. How Isla came to be inhabited is not our
problem here, but on Isla there are, in fact, many
animals who eat the grass as well as others, including
humans, who prey on these. The human inhabitants of
Isla find it easy to obtain flesh foods and to prepare
these in simple ways, easier than their counterparts
elsewhere find the obtaining of ingredients for and the
preparation ofbread. Finally, they have found it helpful,
when ill, to imbibe certain boiled meats or a clear meat
broth. Gassendi's arguments for vegetarianism would
support the eating of flesh on Isla. Therefore, it would
seem, his arguments support not vegetarianism as such,
but rather a spare and simply prepared diet of whatever
nutritious foods are readily available.
Gassendi, though, would reject this result, because
he would claim that the inhabitants of our hypothetical
island Isla are in a hardship situation that conflicts
with what is natural for human beings. He claims:

most necessary for the preservation of either
an entire genus or for the preservation of
individual animals. [G,2.701]
From this viewpoint, what is moral and what is natural
. coincide, because God, as the designer of nature, is
the cause of the natural inclinations and aversions, and
the pleasures and pains, which combine to constitute our
affections and to influence our actions. The natural is
that which is in accordance with the divine plan; doing
with a little is natural for human beings because a diet
of only that which is necessary for health is what, in
fact, in God's plan, is most conducive to human wellbeing. Nothing natural to us, i.e., nothing necessary for
our well-being, can cause us pain. Pain is God's means
of guiding us to avoid that which is harmful to us, that
which is not natural for humans beings in the divine
design. As Such, acting so as to avoid pain is a moral
requirement, respecting God's will.
For Gassendi, then, the natural, in regard to diet,
includes all that humans can consume without ill
effect, in accordance with the divine plan. The
necessary is a subclass of the natural, and consists in
the minimum, chosen from what is natural to human
beings, that is required to maintain human health.
Gassendi tells us that "Flesh seems to be no natural
food for human beings." [TD, 288] According to
Gassendi, eating flesh is not necessary for human wellbeing, it is not a proper element in a minimal human
diet, because it is not natural for human beings-it
violates the divine plan and hence can be detrimental
to human health and can cause pain.
In a letter to Van Helmont written in 1729, Gassendi
rejects Van Helmont's claim that meat is a natural food
for human beings. He says:

The best and only remedy to pass our lives free
and void of trouble, is to suit ourselves to nature,
to desire nothing but what it requires.... [ID, 18]
and
[A]ccording to our natural inclination, we
must love these things and make them the end
of that chief happiness, which consists in the
acquisition of such things as are according to
nature. [TD, 143-144]

From the formation of our teeth, it can be seen
that we are not prepared by nature to be flesheating animals. To animals, such as lions,
tigers, bears, dogs, cats, and others, which
nature prepared for this nourishment, she
gave long, pointed, sharp, separated, unequal
teeth. On the contrary, to those that should
eat herbs and fruits, nature gave teeth that
are short, wide, obtuse, contiguous and
disposed in a single series, as one can notice
in horses, cows, sheep, deer and other
creatures. Now the teeth of men are not like
those of the former genus, but of this latter.

Gassendi, unlike Epicurus, maintains that God's
providence justifies our trust in the guidance of nature,
for God has artfully arranged his creation so that
creatures naturally desire their own good, and are guided
by their natural experience of pleasure and pain in their
pursuit of that good.
The whole ofGassendi's moral philosophy, in which
the moral is identified with the natural, is unified by
his account of divine providence.
The Designer of Nature...seasoned all actions
with the spice of pleasure; and willed the
greatest pleasures for those future acts that are
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Therefore, it is probable nature wishes us to
be nourished not on meat as the prior, but on
fruits as the posterior. 10

desire for self-preservation and a natural fear of death.
In this context, Gassendi objects to the Stoic view that
death, and therefore suicide, is no evil. The fact that,
as a fundamental inclination governing all other actions,
"Nature furnishes all sorts of animals with a natural
love of life" [TD, 29] and a natural aversion to death
provides evidence that preservation of one's life is a
fundamental moral requirement Hence, from Gassendi's
viewpoint, the defense or preservation ofone's life would
justify a needed violation of moral requirements of
sobriety, which are concerned with promoting one's own
well-being. That is, that minimal diet which is necessary
is, under normal circumstances a subclass of the natural,
but, conditions may occur where that which is necessary
for survival, the fundamental consideration, departs
from what is natural. That which is requisite for
preservation of one's life outweighs what is natural and
necessary for well-being, so, though the human
inhabitants of Isla may suffer discomforts and even risk
illness by eating flesh, this is preferable to starvation.
It might be argued that Gassendi's providentialism
is questionable, and, without this presupposition, his
arguments provide us, at best, with self-interested health
reasons for vegetarianism, but not moral reasons. One
therefore might object that even if we were to grant
that all flesh is detrimental to human health, itself a
questionable assumption, vegetarianism would at best
be a matter of prudence, not a moral requirement To
examine the force of this objection to Gassendi's
account, we tum, in the following section, to Gassendi's
discussion of our moral obligations to others.

Gassendi further maintains that flesh is too succulent
for our bodies, and eating flesh foods overburdens the
stomach, impedes digestion, and causes illness. He
explains that meat must be digested wholly in the
stomach rather than in the mouth; the body is overwhelmed by this substance. Nourishment by fruits does
not produce this kind ofeffect. On the contrary, Gassendi
tells us, fruits are a light nourishment. As such, they do
not overburden the stomach, they are easily digested,
and they form a chyle sufficient for our nourishment.
That humans are by nature vegetarians is, for Gassendi,
evident in the physical structure of our teeth and in our
physiological reactions to what is eaten, and, in this,
for Gassendi, God's will and guidance to us is clear.
Further, it is his view that what is natural and what is
moral coincide, and, therefore, it is imperative to act in
accordance with our nature, i.e. with God's will.
Yet there can be a conflict ofvalues in obeying God's
will, and this is the case for the inhabitants of Isla. As
religious Jews during the holocaust found it the lesser
of evils to eat unkosher foods rather than starve, so too
the human beings on Isla, in effect, in a lifeboat
situation, are justified in eating flesh, but as a lesser of
evils, for the sake of survival.
Gassendi explains:
[T]he f"rrst inclination thatNature has bestowed
on us is self-preservation; that we may
preserve ourselves such as we ought to be; that
we are men made up of soul and body; and
therefore according to our natural inclination,
we must love these things, and make them the
end of that chief happiness which consists in
the acquisition of such things as are according
to Nature. [TD,143-144]

II

Moral obligations to others are the fundamental
consideration in Gassendi's discussion of the virtue of
justice. Gassendi attributes to Epicurus the view that
obligations of justice rest upon a mutual contract and
so exclude relations between humans and animals.
From this Epicurean viewpoint:

and
[T]here is no kind of right and injury, of just
or unjust between the rest of animals, because
it was not possible to make any agreement
between them, that they should do no mischief
to one another: So there ought not to be
between nations which could not or would not
make any such compact, to do no wrong one
to another. [TD,319]

Every creature of whatsoever nature loves
itself, or any part of itself, or the use of that
part, or any of the things, which are according
to nature, and its slate and frame. [TD, 144]
Gassendi argues at some length that human beings,
indeed all animals, have a natural and fundamental
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Gassendi also discusses moral obligations to others
that fall under considerations of temperance. In
discussing temperance, which encompasses virtues
related to the proper regulation of desires, Gassendi
considers actions which arise from the experience of
other-interested affections. For example, he claims:

Further, we are told that it is:
Incident to a weak, cowardly and savage
nature, to show cruelty to those who are
overcome, nay, though they have given no
particular provocation... [ID, 297]

It is human and natural to be afflicted with
those that suffer. [TD,300]

and
Reason forbids us to be cruel against the innocent, who never did us any harm ... [ID, 30]

Gassendi notes:

Gratuitous cruelty to innocents, including animals, as
other wrongs of intemperance, is neither natural nor
necessary. It is unnatural because it violates the empathy
or shared pain that is naturally raised in us by the
apprehension ofpain experienced by others. According
to Gassendi, divine providence guarantees that nothing
unnatural is necessary, and, consistently with this, he
maintains that killing animals is not necessary for
human well-being. It would seem that, for Gassendi,
the killing of an animal as of another human being is
justif18ble only as an act of self-defense.
He further explains of all sentient beings:

[It is] strange to consider how great an
affection we have for those whom we read of
in history to have shown themselves very kind
and merciful, and how we abominate those
who have been barbarous and cruel. [ID,298]

The pleasure and pain of our natural affections, e.g.,
"the grief or concern that we have for another's
calamity," [ID, 299] guides us towards the virtues of
mercy, gentleness, and clemency. Divine providence
has so arranged human nature that, for us, there are pure
pleasures, which are never accompanied by pain, and
stable pleasures, which as natural and necessary produce
no pain or misery. Pure pleasures and stable pleasures
are easy to obtain and never require causing pain to
others. But, for Gassendi, are animals included among
these others towards whom our action is guided by a
natural empathy? It would seem so, since, in explaining
the Epicurean view of our moral obligations to animals,
he likens our relation to nonhuman animals to our
relation to humans outside of our society and its laws.
We are told:

Nature has made us all related and a kin, by
bringing us forth from the same principles and
of the same elements. 'Tis Nature hath given
us a mutual affection and love, and for the
same ends. 'Tis Nature hath established what
is right, just and equitable to its Law. 'TIs a
greater evil to be the cause of wrong than to
suffer it Nature commands that our hands
should be always ready to afford assistance.
[ID, 370-371]

You may perhaps here by the by ask why we
kill those creatures... , which we have no
reason to fear? I confess we may do this
sometimes through intemperance and cruelty,
as by inhumanity and barbarity we often
abuse such sometimes who are out of our
society, and of whom 'tis not possible that
we should apprehend any danger of evil.
[TD,321]

Human beings become conscious ofa natural bond with
other creatures who are capable of suffering pain by
the regular experience ofcompassion or empathy, which
is raised naturally in apprehending the suffering of
innocent sentient beings. The pain or suffering of other
sentient beings naturally raises in us the "griefor
concern that we have for another's calamity" [ID, 299],
and with this, the reasoned condemnation of gratuitous
cruelty. We come to view all sentient beings as a single
community. From this viewpoint, to do well, we ought
to treat all who are capable of suffering pain in
accordance with the following revised principle of
least pain: "Living well" consists in doing that which

Killing of animals that is not in self-defense is characterized as an offence "against temperance, or...[against]
its species, viz., such as sobriety, gentleness, or humanity
and a natural goodness." [TO, 321]
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will be most effective in minimizing physical or mental
pain in oneself and in others.
We might draw from this an implicit endorsement of
a moral sense theory in which sympathy, or the pain
naturally experienced in apprehending the suffering of
others, leads moral agents to apprehend that causing pain
in any sentient being is wrong. Animals, as capable of
suffering pain, would be, from this viewpoint, regarded
as moral subjects, to be treated in accordance with the
principle of least pain. Once again we confront
Gassendi's providentialism. God has so designed us
that we naturally experience sympathy with the pain
of sentient creatures. This natural experience guides us
to refrain from cruelty towards all sentient creatures.
However, it might be claimed that this does not
provide grounds for vegetarianism. That is, ifan animal,
or even a human being, is treated well and killed
painlessly, why is it morally wrong to eat that creature?
We have not caused any pain to an individual capable
of suffering pain.
We might respond that Gassendi's view that
empathetic perception of others is natural led him to
regard the use ofanimals as food as unacceptable. That
is, though, from Gassendi's viewpoint, human beings
are presently misled by the acquired custom of using
animals as food, the sympathy experienced in relation
to sentient beings can be said to naturally motivate moral
agents, not misled by custom, to refrain from using
animals as food.
Further, we can argue that this account does provide
some basis for vegetarianism. Indeed, ifa painless death
cannot be assured, and if we accept the principle of
least pain applied to the community of all individuals
capable of suffering pain, along with the recognition
that eating flesh is not necessary for human selfpreservation, then, it would appear, that doing well under
these conditions would involve not eating flesh.
Finally, the killing of animals is explicitly
considered:

Every creature of whatsoever nature loves
itself, or any part of itself, or the use of that
part, or any of the things, which are according
to nature, and its state and frame. [TO,144]
There is a moral requirement that moral agents act to
support their own natural desire for self-preservation.
Therefore Gassendi would maintain of moral agents
that It is never wrong to defend one's life by legal
means where possible or by the most human means
available, where legal means have no force.
This position is consistent with the presumption of a
moral requirement that moral agents respect the natural
desire that other creatures have for their own selfpreservation. From this viewpoint all killing that is
avoidable, i.e., that is not necessary for the defense of
one's life, would be morally wrong. The eating of flesh
is not necessary for human well-being and so is not
required for the defense of human life. Therefore, the
killing of animals for food would be morally wrong.
Vegetarianism would be required not solely on the
prudential grounds that it is better for human health. It
would be required for human beings because it is wrong
for a moral agent to kill an innocent being that loves its
own life. Itcan be argued that such action is, inGassendi's
terms, cruel, barbarous, inhumane, and therefore immoral
as a violation of the virtue of temperance.
Still, if I gratuitously damage my fme crystal pitcher
by smashing it with a hammer, this can be called
intemperate, as a failure of proper self-control, but not
thereby immoral. Acts of intemperance are character
failings, violations of requirements of self-control.
While an intemperate act may be seen as a failure to
fulfill a moral requirement, it does not constitute a
failure to fulfIll a moral obligation in the strong sense.
Moral wrong-doing in the strong sense, is, in Gassendi's
terms, injustice. In what follows I will consider support
for vegetarianism from a Gassendist viewpoint, not on
grounds of temperance, as argued above, but rather on
grounds of justice.
Gassendi rejects the analyses of animal cognition
provided by his Cartesian and Aristotelian contemporaries. ll His analysis, to which we now turn, further
supports the view that animals are moral subjects. 12

You may perhaps here by the by ask why we
kill those creatures... , which we have no
reason to fear? [TO,321]
The killing of an innocent being that loves its life and
desires its own survival is regarded as gratuitous cruelty.
As indicated in the previous section, it is Gassendi's
view that all sentient beings love life and have a natural
desire for their own survival. He says:
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III

whereas if any such machines bore a
resemblance to our bodies or imitated our
actions as closely as possible for all practical
purposes, we should still have two very certain
means of recogniiing that they were not real
men. The frrst is that they could never use
words, or put together other signs, as we do in
order to declare our thoughts to others....
Secondly,... they [act] ... not through understanding, but only from the disposition of their
organs... .it is for all practical purposes impossible for a machine to have enough different
organs to make it act in all the contingencies
of life in the way in which our reason makes
us act. [AT, VI, 56-57; C, 1.139-140]

From Gassendi's viewpoint, animals are not moral
agents. Only human beings have moral obligations
because only human beings have the reflective
capacities that are essential to understanding moral
principles. But, I wish to claim, Gassendi's account is
consistent with the view that animals are moral subjects,
whose natural desire for life ought to be respected by
moral agents.
Gassendi's chief adversaries, Cartesians and
Aristotelians, 13 rejected the view that animals are moral
subjects. Cartesians maintained that animals have no
moral statuS. 14 Aristotelians, who viewed animals as
property under the dominion of humans, objected to
needless physical abuse of these sensitive creatures on
grounds of benevolence but saw no problem with the
humane killing of animals for human use. Gassendi's
departure from these adversaries in his analysis of the
nature of animals supports a different view of our
obligations to animals.· In this final section, I will
consider this departure.
Gassendi explicitly objects to Descartes' view that
animals cannot think,15 In the Discourse. Descartes
presents the view that animals have no conscious
awareness: 16

According to Descartes, animals are seen to be irrational
because they cannot use speech and they cannot use
reason to freely choose how they will act. He underlines
the importance of understanding the great difference
between the natures of animals and humans because
failing to perceive this distinction can have moral
implications:
...after the error ofthose who deny God...there
is none that leads weak minds further from the
straightpath ofvirtue than that ofimagining that
the souls of the beasts are of the same nature as
ours, and hence that after this present life we
have nothing to fear or hope for, any more than
flies and ants... [AT, VI. 59-60; C, 1.14U

This will not seem at all strange to those who
know how many kinds of automatons, or
moving machines, the skill of man can
construct with the use of very few parts, in
comparison with the great multitude of bones,
muscles, nerves, arteries, veins and all the
other parts that are in the body of any animal.
For they will regard this body as a machine
which, having been made by the hands of
God, is incomparably better ordered than any
machine that can be devised by man, and
contains in itself movements more wonderful
than those in any such machine. [AT, VI.
55-56; C, 1.139]

Gassendi, in his objections to Descartes' Meditations,
responds to Descartes' arguments. In response to the
claim that animals cannot speak, Gassendi argues:
You may say they do not speak. But although
they do not produce human speech (since of
course they are not human beings), they still
produce their own form of speech, which they
employ just as we do ours. You may say that
even a delirious man can still string words
together to express his meaning, which even the
wisest of the brutes cannot do. But surely you
are not being fair if you expect the brutes to
employ human language and are not prepared
to consider their own kind of language. But to
go into this would need a much longer
discussion. [AT, VII, 271; C, 2.189]

Descartes argues, in support of this view:
.. .if any such machine has the organs and
outward shape of a monkey or of some other
animal that lacks reason, we should have no
means of knowing that they did not possess
entirely the same nature as these animals;
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He says of freedom of choice in acting:

However, animals experience sensations and, with this,
pleasure and pain; they are capable of imagistic
reasoning and of exercising will or choice. Hence,
postulating a fundamental continuity among the whole
community of animals, Gassendi suggests that the
difference between the cognitive powers of humans and
other animals is "merely one of degree," not kind.
In addition, Gassendi objects to the Aristotelian
analysis of animal cognition, presented in his time, for
example, by Suarez. Suarez argues:

You may say that you are free and the soul has
the power of preventing a man from both
fleeing and advancing. But the principle of
cognition does just this in the case of an
animal: a dog, despite his fear of threats and
blows may rush forward to grab a morsel it
has seen-and a man often does just the same
sort of thing! You may say that a dog barks
simply from impulse, and not, as happens
when a man speaks, from choice. But in the
case of man, too, there are causes at work
which may lead us to judge that he speaks from
some impulse. What you attribute to choice
occurs as a result of a stronger impulse, and
indeed the brute, too, exercises choice, when
one impulse is greater than another. Indeed, I
have seen a dog matching his barks to the
sound of a trumpet, so as to imitate all the
changes in the notes, whether sharp or flat, or
slow or fast. And it managed to do this even
when the tempo of the notes was arbitrarily
and unexpectedly speeded up, or when the
notes where unexpectedly drawn out. [AT, VII,
270; C, 2.188-9]

But Aristotle clearly writes in the Politics VII,
at the end of chapter thirteen, that man alone
has reason. Whereas in brute animals there is
no sign, or effect, in which they show the use
of reason. Hence, they have neither proper
speech, nor freedom in operating, but are led
by natural instinct.19
Suarez, like Gassendi, objects to the view that animals
experience no sense awareness. Speaking of those who
"deny sensitivity to them," i.e., to animals, he states:
"But truly, this opinion is intolerable, and a great
paradox...." [S, III.500]20 According to Suarez, animals
experience sensation, but they are incapable of
reasoning or will. Animal activity is not the ·result of
choice based upon thought; it is the automatic response
to a stimulus determined solely by "natural instinct."
Gassendi explicitly objects to the view that animal
behavior can be described as the effect of"blind instinct"
Animal behavior, like human behavior, he claims,
involves learning from one's experience or from one's
associates, along with a rudimentary sort of reasoning.
From the natural experience of pain, e.g., of hunger, and,
in tum, of the pleasure involved in relieving such pains,
associations are formed by the imagination [or phantasy]
which serve to direct future pursuit and avoidance
behavior. Gassendi says of instinct:

He adds, considering the use of reason:
You may say that brutes lack reason. Well, of
course they lack human reason, but they do
not lack their own kind of reason. So it does
not seem appropriate to call them 'aloga'
['irrational'] except by comparison with us or
with our kind of reason; and in any case 'logos'
or reason seems to be a general term, which can
be attributed to them no less than the cognitive
faculty or internal sense. You may say that
animals do not employ rational argument But
although they do not reason so perfectly or
about as many subjects as man, they still reason,
and the difference seems to be merely one of
degree. [AT, VII, 270-271; C, 2.189]17

It is easy to understand from all this that what
we call instinct is a certain motion which is not
blind, but is in fact directed by the phantasy;
and this, in part, by a simple apprehension of
good or bad, principally when it is present, and,
in part, also by reasoning, in so far as one
judges of the good or bad which should follow
in the future and of which one has some sort
of presentiment. This motion, then, is the
spontaneous use of the parts properly destined

Gassendi, objecting to Descartes' view of animals,
maintains that animals have a capacity to think, though
not all the powers of thought that human beings have.
He claims that animals cannot reflect on their own
mental awareness or formulate abstract ideas. 1 g
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to act with regard to this reasoning, as the use
of the feet to flee, that of the hom, tooth and the
like to attack. .. [G, 2.415]

An animal loves its own life and learns, from its own
experience or from that of others, to fear and to avoid
those things that are likely to harm it
It is from this viewpoint that Gassendi says that
"Nature furnishes all sorts of animals with a natural
love of life." [TD, 29] Animals think, and they direct
their own actions in the light ofan interest in protecting
and preserving their own lives and well-being. In this
sense, animals as well as human beings have a natural
desire for self-preservation.
In his discussion of justice, Gassendi explains that
one of the "chief offices or general duties of justice
consist(s) in hurting or doing wrong to nobody,"
[TO, 307] where "hurt" or "harm" is used to designate
not simply pain but also any loss of something valued,
for example, of life, of limb, of a loved one, of
property. He notes that not all action that causes harm
is moral wrong-doing, as, for example, where harm is
done by accident or through ignorance. He distinguishes between an unjust action, which includes all
that harms an innocent victim, and an action done
unjustly, or moral wrong-doing, which Gassendi
designates by the term injury.
Injury involves the intent to harm. In addition, injury
is done against the will of the individual harmed:

The pursuit and avoidance behavior of animals follows
from remembering "what has succeeded and what has
not succeeded in order that they infer that they ought or
ought not to perform a certain action." [G,2.415] This,
Gassendi contends, involves not inborn instincts, but
learning from experience and a rudimentary sort of
reasoning, i.e., sense reasoning, which requires the use
of images. Further:
Instructed not only by their own observations
but also by teaching and examples, whether
from their parents or from certain others whose
actions they have seen and from whom the
vestiges remain in the phantasy, they reason
about what they should do. [G, 2.415]
Gassendi provides empirical evidence to support his
hypothesis that the pursuit and avoidance behavior of
animals is based not upon "blind instinct," but rather
upon imagistic or sense reasoning from what has been
experienced or from what has been learned from others.
He cites examples to demonstrate that animals
experience a desire for their own good and for the good
of their offspring, and that they exercise imagistic
reasoning to achieve their ends. Hence, according to
Gassendi, animals are not to be dismissed as wholly
irrational, for they act on the basis of a rudimentary
sort of reasoning and will.
Therefore, Gassendi argues that the avoidance
behavior of animals is motivated by fear, raised by
reasoning from past to future experience, which leads
to the awareness of a danger to life or limb. He claims
that "most animals flee us because they have received
some harm from us" [G, 2.415] and, in support of this
claim, cites reports that, in wilderness areas ofAmerica,
animals, which have never been hunted by human
beings, have no fear of humans. Further, fear of a
particular kind of creature cannot be instinctive:

...because it is one thing to suffer an unjust
act, or to receive a damage, and another to
suffer an injury, a man may willingly suffer
an unjust act but not suffer an injury. For that
reason Aristotle observes that we defme a man
who does an injury: He who hurts, knowing
to whom, in what manner, and how he hurts;
yet that is not sufficient, but we must add this
particular. Against the will of him whom he
hurts. [TO,334]
Gassendi explains that though an individual can cause
himself damage, he cannot act unjustly or do wrong to
himself, because he cannot truly injure or be unjust
towards himself, i.e., he cannot harm himself against
his own will. Further, "no injury can be done to him
who consents and approves of it," unless that consent
is coerced by "some pretence," by "fair promises,"
flattery, or the like. [TO, 335]
Since moral wrong-doing involves intentionally
causing harm to another individual against its will, to
morally wrong another, the victim must be capable of
exercising will. From Gassendi's viewpoint, a rock

It may even be that the lamb wouldn't flee the
wolf if it hadn't learned to flee with the others
and if it hadn't perceived the wolf coming at
it with its mouth ajar. Moreover, the lamb
doesn't flee the wolf it knows nor the hare the
dog with whom it was raised. [G, 2.416]
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or plant can be damaged but cannot be treated unjustly.
for. since neither can exercise will. no action can be
taken against the will of either one. But. as discussed
above. according to Gassendi. all animals do exercise
will. All desire to avoid harm and they act to preserve
their own lives and well-being. The will of an animal
intentionally directed to this end can be thwarted. As
such. an animal can be the victim of injustice or moral
wrong-doing. 21
Finally. we might note that Gassendi postulates
that harm to others is a wrong-doing of justice.
because justice "consists in rendering to everyone
that which belongs to him." [TO. 306] He contends
that it is a requirement ofjustice that each individual
be given control over and free use of that which
belongs to him without constraint or interference.
Such interference. when it is intentional and against
the will of the recipient. is an injury and is unjust.
Gassendi explains:

of those things that naturally belong to them. That is. it
is morally wrong to infringe upon the power or
command over those things that naturally belong to any
individual. including animals. without sufficient reason.
This line of reasoning further supports vegetarianism.
for. from this viewpoint, it would be morally wrong in
the strong sense. i.e.• on grounds of justice. to infringe
upon any individual's right to life. including animals.
unless this can be justified as an act of self-defense.
As stated above. for Gassendi. nothing immoral is
natural to human beings. And consistent with
Gassendi's claims. one might conclude, whether on
grounds of temperance or justice: it is because killing
creatures that love their own lives is morally wrong
that God has so designed human beings that eating flesh
is unnatural to them. From this viewpoint, vegetarianism would be a moral requirement. one which divine
providence.by our natural empathy. our natural structure
and our natural pains. guides us to note.

This has given occasion to the lawyers to
define justice. A constant and perpetual will
or resolution to give or restore to everyone
his right; that is to say. that which justly
belongs to him. [TD. 307]
He adds "these words comprehend the function and the
proper act ofjustice": "To render to everyone his right."

rro.308]
A right from this viewpoint is a power to exercise
one's will that ought to be recognized and respected.
Gassendi equates "what belongs to everyone as his
right" with "what authority. power. and command
everyone has over anything." rro. 311] Intentional
infringement upon or limitation of such authority or
power. without sufficient reason. is the sort of harm
that is characterized by Gassendi as an injury or moral
wrong-doing. Gassendi refers to one's jurisdiction over
that which belongs to one by nature. including life and
"the natural faculties of sensation. of imagination. of
appetite. of self-motion. of preserving and nourishing
oneself...... [TO. 2.798] as animal rights. He distinguishes these animal rights from another sort of rights.
e.g.• to property. which are distinctly human rights
because the acquiring of this sort of authority or power
requires a contractual agreement. This suggests that
Gassendi may have departed from the Epicurean view
that animals have no rights. maintaining instead that
animals have rights to the unhampered use and control
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1 I gratefully acknowledge that research for this paper
was partially funded by a grant from the Research Foundation of the City University of New York. All translations
are my own unless otherwise noted. I have modernized
spelling and grammar in quotations from seventeenthcentury English texts.
2 Gassendi speaks of his indebtedness to Epicurus in
respect to the development of his own moral theory as early
as 1624 [Exercitationum Paradoxicarum Adversus
Aristoteleos..., Book I (Grenoble. 1624). preface]. Some
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selections from this work are translated into English by Craig

Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); R.
H. Kargon. Atomism in England from Hariot to Newton
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). esp. ch. 8. Margaret 1.
Osler. considering the views of Descartes and Gassendi,
argues: ''In England, at least, Gassendi's views seem to have
prevailed...Gassendi·s mitigated skepticism and nominalist
ontology became characteristic of English Science as
represented in the works of Boyle and Newton. John Locke
took up Gassendi's views and elaborated them in his Essay
Concerning Human Understanding, which is marked by many
of Gassendi's arguments. and, in places, even his language."
[Osler. "Providence and Divine Will in Gassendi's Views on
Scientific Knowledge," Journal ofthe History ofldeas (1983),
vol. 44, p. 549]. See also the seventeenth-century work
by Wm. Charleton, Physiologica Epicuro-GassendoCharltoniana: a Fabrick of Science Natural upon the
Hypothesis of Atoms, Founded by Epicurus, Repaired by
Petrus Gassendus... (London, 1654). The Epicurean revival
in Britain is the subject ofT. F. Mayo's Epicurus in England
(1650-1725) (Dallas: The Southwest Press, 1934), and is also
discussed in A. A. Long's Hellenistic Philosophy (Berkeley:
University of California Press. 1986). ch. 6.

B. Brush (ed. & trans.), The Selected Works ofPierre Gassendi
(New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation. 1972).
3 Gassendi's Epicurean Synragma was fIrst published as
an appendix to his three volume Animadversions in Decimum
Librum Diogenis Laertii (Lyons: G. Barbier, 1649). It was
subsequently published separately (The Hague, 1659), then
together with Gassendi's lnstitutio Logica (London, 1660 and
1668). See also, Thomas Stanley's 1660 English translation
of Gassendi's Epicurean Synragma, [T. Stanley, The History
ofPhilosophy (London: Moseley and Dring. 1655-61). vol. 3,
pp. 849-935]; henceforth noted as SPE. For a detailed listing
of Gassendi's publicati~ see O. R. Bloch, La Philosophie
de Gassendi (The Hague: Martimis Nijhoff. 1971),
pp. xxviii-xxx; and B. Rochot. Dictionary of Scientific
Biography, article on Gassendi.

4 For Gassendi's moral theory. see, in particular, the section
on Ethic in his Synragma Philosophicum [Po Gassendi. Opera
Omnia (Lyons, 1658), vol. 2]; henceforth noted as G. This is
the standard collection of Gassendi's Works. It is in six
volumes. The Synragma Philosophiae Epicuri is in volume 4.

8 For another seventeenth-century English translation of
the section on ethics of Gassendi's Philosophiae Epicuri
Synragma, see Walter Charleton, Epicurus's Morals (London,
1656). Of course, in the seventeenth century. many in Britain
would have known these works not in English but in the
original Latin or French.

Lisa T. Sarasohn, "The Ethical and Political Philosophy
of Pierre Gassendi," Journal of the History of Philosophy
(1982), vol. 20, pp. 239-260, responds to claims of modem
scholars [e.g., Bloch, La Philosophie de Gassendi (op. cit.),
pp. 376-377 and Rochot, "Gassendi: Le Philosophe" in Pierre
Gassendi: Sa Vie et Son Oeuvre (Paris. 1955), p. 99] that
Gassendi's ethics is not original or signifIcant, by.cogently
arguing that Gassendi developed "his own profmmd ethical
and political system" [po 240].
5

9 Gassendi dermed moral philosophy as "the art of acting
well and from virtue." [G. 2.659]

10

P. Gassendi, Three Discourses ofHappiness, Virtue and
Liberty Collectedfrom the Works ofthe Learn' d Gassendi by
Monsieur Bernier (London. 1699); henceforth noted as TD.
I am grateful to the Burke Library of the Union Theological
Seminary in the City of New York for allowing me to study
their copy of this work, This work is attributed to Gassendi
and represents his Latin text quite faithfully. I will attribute
quotes from this work to Gassendi. However, it should be
remembered that this is a direct translation. not of Gassendi's
longer section on Ethics in his Synragma Philosophicum,
but of Bernier's abridgement and French translation of
Gassendi's work.

11 An indication of the seventeenth-century concern with
and controversy over animal cognition is clear from the
following selection of seventeenth-century works: Chanet,
Pierre, De I'instinct et de la connoissance des animaux avec
I'examen de ce que M. de La Chambre a escrit sur cette
matiere. La Rochelle, 1646; Cyprian, Johann, Sensus et
cognito in brutis adversus Antonium Le Grand, 1676;
Dannanson, Jean M., La Beste transformee en machine.. .que
Ie systeTne de M. Descartes et son opinion touchant les bestes
n' onr rien de dangereux.... 1668. [English translation. A
Discourse... (London: Pitt, 1670)]; De La Chambre, Louis,
"De la connoissance des betes," Les Caracteres des
Passions... , 1645, vol 2; Traite de la connoissance des
Animaux...• 1647; Dilly, Antoine. De l' arne des betes...
(Lyons, 1676); Le Grand, Pere Antoine, Dissertatio de
carentia sensus et cognitionis in brutis (London, 1675);
Pardies. Pere Ignace Gaston, S.1., Discours de la connoissance
des bestes, 1672; Sennert, Daniel, De origine et natura

7 Gassendi was very influential in seventeenth-century
France and England. For evidence of the influence of his
Epicurean moral theory, see, for example, E. & F. Michael,
"A Note on Gassendi in England," Notes and Queries
(September, 1990), pp. 297-299. For the influence of his
Epicurean physical theory, see, for example, Lynn Sumida
Joy, Gassendi the Atomist, Advocate ofHistory in an Age of
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animarum in brutis (Frankfurt, 1638); Willis Thomas, Two
Discourses Concerning the Souls ofBrutes... (London, 1672).

boards by their four paws to vivisect them and see
the circulation ofthe blood which was a great subject
ofconversation." [N. Fontaine, Memoirespour servir
a I'histoire de Port-Royal (1738), vol. 2, pp. 52-3;
translation by L. C. Rosenfield, op. cit., p. 54.]

12 Gassendi's distinctive analysis is frequently overlooked
by contemporary commentators. See, for example, the
contrast of Descartes' modem view of animals as automata
with the view of the seventeenth-untury Peripatetics by R.
M. YOlmg ["Animal Soul," Encyclopedia ofPhiWsophy (New
York: Macmillan, 1967), vol. I, pp. 122-127]: "Descartes's
most formidable opponents in the seventeenth-untury were
the Peripatetics...." The Gassendist view, a view similar in
many respects to the view later adopted by Locke, is attributed
to Locke. Ball., in his interesting discussion in "Cartesian
Doctrine and the Animal Soul" [Cartesian Studies (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1951), pp. 106-157] similarly
speaks of the early seventeenth century opponents of
automatism as "being in the main Scholastics" [po 110];
Gassendi's arguments against automatism are not discussed.
The view that Descartes' view of mind, body and animals
was the modem view is presupposed in such articles as: 1.
Jaynes, "The Problem of Animate Motion in the Seventeenth
Century," Journal of the History of Ideas (1970), vol. 31,
pp. 219-234; E. S. Reed, "Descartes' Corporeal Ideas
Hypothesis and the Origin of Scientific Psychology," Review
ofMetaphysics (1982), vol. 35, pp. 731-752. L. C. Rosenfield
[From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine (New York: Octagon
Books, 1968)] presents a fairly broad perspective of
seventeenth-century views in her discussion of reactions to
Descartes' analysis of animals as automata.

IS For Descartes' presentation of his view of animals as
automata, see, for example, Descartes' discussion in his
Discourse on Method [C. Adams & P. Tannery, eds., Oevres
de Descartes (paris: 1897-1913), vol. 7, pp. 55-57; henceforth
noted as AT; 1. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch,
translators, The Philosophical Writings ofDescartes (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), vol. I, pp. 139-140;
henceforth noted as C.].

16 For Descartes, the complete distinctness of mind and
body, as a thinking and an extended substance respectively,
implies that animals, as extended substances, have no conscious
awareness. Descartes explicitly states that this means that
animals experience neither pleasure nor pain. See, for example,
his response to Merseene, AT, m. 85,letter 192, June, 1640.
17 See also, other arguments presented in support of
his view of animal cognition in Gassendi's objections to
Meditation n.
18 For further discussion of Gassendi 's arguments, see E.
& F. Michael, "Two Early Modern Concepts of Mind:
Reflecting Substance vs. Thinking Substance," Journal ofthe
History ofPhilosophy (1989), vol. 27, pp. 29-47.

13 We find in theses written for student disputations by
professors of the graduating class in the Scottish Universities,
a valuable source of information about developments,
concerns and influences in seventeenth-century philosophy.
From the middle of the seventeenth century. these provide
the consideration of three basic views, those of the
Aristotelians, the Cartesians and the Epicureans. These three
views have, as chief proponents, Suarez, Descartes and,
popularizer of Epicurean views, Gassendi.

19 R. P. Francisci Suarez, Opera Omnia, De Anima, (L.
Vives: Paris, 1856ff.), vol. 3, p. 500; henceforth noted as
S. Suarez, an influential representative of Thomistic
Aristote1ianism, discusses animal cognition in his De Anima,
which·was published posthumously in 1620.

14Though Descartes himself was never accused of
mistreating animals, many of his followers were associated
with callousness and cruelty towards animals by their
contemporaries. Fontaine, speaking of Descartes' followers
at Arnauld's Port-Royale-des-Champs, derides the attitude of
Cartesians towards animals:

20 Suarez does not identify any proponents of this
position. The view that animals function as automata was
held before Descartes by, for example, the Spanish physician,
Gomez Pereira [Antoniana-Margarita, Medina del Campo,
1554]. For disCussion of Pereira, see, for example: N. A.
Cortes, "Gomez Pereira y Luis de Mercado datos para su
biografia," Revue Hispanique (1914), vol. 31, pp. 2-29; E.
Bullon y Fernandez, Les Precursores espanoles de Bacon y
Descartes (Salamanca, 1905).

'They administered beatings to dogs with perfect
indifference, and made fun of those who pitied the
creatures as if they had felt pain. They said that the
animals were clocks; that the cries they emitted when
struck were only the noise of a little spring which
had been touched, but that the whole body was
without feeling. They nailed poor animals up on

21 This Gassendist position is at variance with the
thoroughgoing contractarian account of justice which
Gassendi attributes to Epicurus. There is no evidence that
Gassendi himself held the view that animals are members
of a moral community, or that he recognized moral patients
that are not moral subjects, but these assumptions are consistent with a Gassendist analysis of justice.
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